

## NATO IN TRANSITION

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### INTRODUCTION: STABILITY IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD

True security has seldom been a natural state of affairs, but rather has nearly always been the product of anticipating events and devising solutions to new problems. This is therefore a good time for launching a serious review. We all benefit from a wide and rigorous debate about the nature of the new security environment, and there is a great interest in the rest of Europe in what Turkish intellectuals and politicians are thinking.

I believe that we still have a lot of thinking to do before we come to terms with the profound changes we have seen in the past decade. The end of the Cold War meant that the main security problem that we faced together in the Alliance also ended. We no longer have to confront the monolithic threat that the Soviet Union represented to the Alliance. Yet only the naive and those ignorant of history could believe that the end of the Cold War also meant that security and stability would no longer have to be worked for. As we see in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and elsewhere, there are many problems -ethnic, social, economic- which the Cold War suppressed and masked. For decades the rigidity of Communism denied the opportunity for Europe's eastern half to develop in a way which would have eroded and softened ancient sources of tension and ethnic dividing lines. Instead, the arbitrary way internal problems were dealt with, without consultation or democracy, meant that in many cases there is now a greater sense of grievance and injustice than we would have imagined.

The new security issues have the capacity to destabilise Europe beyond the immediate source of the problem. Turkey, because of its geographical position, may be more exposed than many Allies to some of the new risks: all Allies, however, can be equally affected by the spread of instability. In such an environment, we need the collective wisdom and experience of all the Allies as much today as before. Our security remains indivisible -no single Ally could realistically hope to achieve better security for itself through its own isolated efforts. The value of Turkey as an Ally thus remains not only undiminished, but increased. It has a role to play in stabilising the turbulent areas in which it is situated. Its wisdom and experience is also valuable in the constant consultations, exchanges of information and collective diplomacy exercised by the Alliance across a whole range of security issues.

### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IFOR

The period since the end of the Cold War has been a tumultuous one -one in which our hopes of creating an enduring security order for a democratic and undivided Europe were often confounded by the grim reality of warfare in Europe's midst. It has been a period of highs and lows, of creative thinking and institution-building, and of much rhetorical flourish. This time of talk and transition now is coming to an end. Indeed, 1996 could be the year in which practice finally replaces theory and the pieces of a new European security architecture can begin to come together.

And it is the Bosnian crisis, for so long a bone of contention, that has given new impetus to drawing the pieces together. There, NATO is leading an unprecedented international coalition for peace which includes Russia, our partners from Central and Eastern Europe, formerly neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden, and even non-European nations such as Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco. IFOR is thus the first concrete expression of an integrated and cooperative approach to security in the new Europe.

The tasks we have set for ourselves are clear and achievable: to implement the military aspects of the Dayton agreement, to oversee and ensure the separation of forces and their withdrawal into clearly defined areas. In short, we will provide the assurance needed for

peace to take root. Once we have dealt with the military side of the equation, the civil and political reconstruction can gain its full momentum.

The scale of the operation and number of participating nations, the unprecedented level and range of coordination between the Implementation Force and the reconstruction effort -this is new ground we have broken in putting our concept of cooperative security to work. It is a very hopeful development in the long-term security situation in Europe. In the months ahead, we will be watched closely -and rightly so- to see how the new Alliance is coping with this, its largest and most complex peace support mission to date.

We are well aware that there will be risks and dangers. But our planning and preparation has helped reduce the risks to the very minimum. The IFOR is organised and equipped to protect itself and, if necessary, to use force to implement the Peace Plan. NATO has already demonstrated that we can use force powerfully, accurately and selectively. The deterrent value of the force is beyond question. Provided that we maintain agreement on the strategic level, we can deal with whatever tactical irritations might occur.

IFOR expects to finish its work within the planned twelve months agreed in Dayton. After all, the NATO force should be a helping hand, not a permanent crutch. It is evident, however, that long-term peace requires a long-term programme of economic and civil reconstruction. As one observer put it: if the civil reconstruction does not succeed, Dayton will amount to little more than the most expensive cease-fire in history. Building a bridge across a river is not the same as building new confidence and reconciliation among people who have fought each other for the past four years and more.

Our support of the economic and civil reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina is therefore all the more vital. The work of the civil agencies in Bosnia, and the assistance they can provide and are providing, are essential if the process of civil and political reconstruction can really take hold. Provided that it does not detract from our primary mission, NATO will do its utmost to ensure the closest coordination with civilian agencies in Bosnia.

#### LEARNING THE LESSONS OF BOSNIA

It is in Bosnia where our post-Cold War vision of a new and better Europe has been most challenged. If there is one lesson in the positive turnaround in events in Bosnia since the autumn of 1995, it is that the active involvement of the United States in European security affairs continues to make a crucial impact. Indeed, the IFOR operation is a resounding confirmation of the transatlantic link and of NATO.

It is easy for us today to bemoan the earlier lack of Allied cohesion and determination in handling this conflict, but I think the important thing in Bosnia is not how the story began but how we are now going to shape the future. After all, history teaches that democracies are slow to react to challenges, and reluctant to reach immediately for the sword -and that is by and large to their credit. But history also teaches that the democracies are an irresistible force when they are at last moved to unity and to action, as NATO is proving today in Bosnia.

We now must learn from both our early difficulties and subsequent achievements in Bosnia to ensure that the Alliance can meet similar challenges down the road. What we have to remember is that NATO is a peacekeeping instrument par excellence; when its European and North American members decide to consult politically and then act jointly at an early stage in a crisis, it is likely that conflict such as we witnessed in Bosnia can be halted before it gets out of hand.

And so the number one lesson of the past few years is that working separately and at cross purposes, the US and its European Allies can accomplish little; working together, in NATO, the scope for success is much greater.

This fundamental awareness should also guide us as we move towards the other tasks that our Alliance has to fulfil in the years ahead: to strengthen the security ties with non-member countries, to prepare countries for eventual membership in this Alliance, and to strengthen our relationship with Russia. If we succeed in these tasks, Europe will finally have escaped the fatal logic of seeking security against rather than with each other.

#### CREATING LONG-RANGE STABILITY: PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

Effective practical cooperation, upon which IFOR depends, will give further momentum to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Indeed, one could say that "Operation Joint Endeavour" is the most ambitious PfP exercise ever conceived. The Partnership has put a premium on practical cooperation to develop the capability for Partners and Allies alike to work together jointly in a range of peacekeeping-type operations. It has proved to be tailor-made for the Bosnian situation.

The task now is to intensify PfP cooperation further to reflect the lessons of Bosnia and to ensure its effectiveness as a means of preparing forces for future contingency operations. Up to now PfP has been largely a mechanism to prepare partners for IFOR; in the future, it must also serve as a mechanism for absorbing and facilitating the experience gained through IFOR. IFOR is a time-limited operation, the task of fostering closer cooperation across the Euro-Atlantic area is not. We must therefore see to it that our unique experience gained in IFOR will not dissipate once we move out of Bosnia. A vibrant PfP is our best insurance against such an eventuality. The mechanisms for further enhancing PfP are already in place. If we use them to the full, the Partnership can act as a catalyst for a common "culture of security cooperation" which has never existed in Europe's past.

#### THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

NATO also has a role in building stability around Europe, not just in it. Today, even more so than in the Cold War, it makes no strategic sense to deal with European security in isolation. In an increasingly interdependent world, European security is interconnected with that of Asia and North Africa. That is why I consider NATO's Mediterranean dialogue to be so significant. Through it, NATO will make a major contribution to peaceful and friendly relations between Europe and its southern neighbours in the Mediterranean region. We have already started to develop new relationships with the countries of North Africa, Israel and Jordan. These relationships will help us gain a better understanding of one another's security concerns and reduce some of the misunderstanding and mistrust towards Europe which the Bosnian conflict has created among the countries of the South.

#### EXTENDING OUR COMMUNITY: NATO'S ENLARGEMENT

Successful cooperation in Bosnia will also serve to enhance knowledge and experience of NATO among those PfP Partners who wish to take on the responsibilities of Alliance membership. Their capacity for inter-operability with NATO forces will doubtless improve as a result of this experience, and they will be keen to match NATO operating standards.

Yet the enlargement of NATO is not about inter-operability alone. It is a process designed to enhance stability by overcoming past divisions, based on principles of cooperation, dialogue and partnership. The enlargement of NATO has to be seen in the broader context of European-wide integration.

Following our well-received Enlargement Study of last September, this year will see an intensified dialogue with Partners interested in joining the Alliance. This dialogue will help further define the steps that these countries must take in preparing for NATO membership. At the same time, the Alliance will continue its own preparations to ensure that NATO itself will emerge from its enlargement with more, not less, cohesion. As the American commentator Walter Lippman used to say, an alliance is like a chain: it is not made stronger by adding weak links to it. Enlargement is a gradual, measured, transparent

process. We will see to it that before enlargement can happen, the new links will be as strong as the existing ones.

#### ESTABLISHING A PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA

Cooperation in "Joint Endeavour" will also hopefully boost our relationship with Russia. A sound NATO-Russia relationship is a key element of the development of a cooperative security structure for the whole of Europe. The participation of a Russian brigade in IFOR and the good cooperation established on the ground between Russian and NATO forces shows that it is possible for NATO and Russia to work side by side as equals in meeting the real security challenges facing the new Europe.

But this is not all. NATO and Russia have also worked together on issues related to the safe and secure dismantling of nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons technology and material. There is no reason why this joint cooperation and consultation cannot go further to address wider issues of European security. It would be a historical mistake to create new dividing lines in Europe or otherwise isolate Russia.

Our goal is to pursue a NATO-Russia relationship which permits both sides to tackle pragmatically the problems we face in common. We will not always agree, nor will we seek to develop a relationship at any price. Our relationship with Russia must be based on the understanding that the principles of responsible international behaviour will be fully respected by all. Our cooperation with Russia aims at improving the security of all Allies, not just of some. That is why we will continue to remind Russia that compliance with legally binding arms control obligations is a necessary foundation for good overall relations. I hope that 1996 is not only the year in which we together bring peace to Bosnia but also will be the year in which we embed the NATO-Russia relationship deeply into the new structure of Security in Europe.

#### ADAPTING NATO'S STRUCTURES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

NATO has changed, and is changing. As we move towards new missions, our military structures will not remain unaffected. The demands of crisis management and peacekeeping, the pressure of reduced defence spending in Allied capitals, and the need for the European Allies to assume greater defence responsibilities require us to make the necessary adjustments to our military structures. In particular, we need to develop the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept further, so that we can be more responsive in Bosnia-type crises, both as regards rapid deployment and incorporating contributions by non-NATO countries.

As our discussions on restructuring the Alliance go forward, however, one thing must remain clear: the principles of the existing integrated military structure should be taken as the basis upon which any new structures are built. Without the decades of operating under a single command, without the unique planning and logistics capabilities of NATO's integrated military structure, an operation of the complexity and magnitude of IFOR could not have been achieved.

Nor will the necessary reform come at the expense of our traditional core function of collective defence. As the Gulf War has demonstrated, even a crisis that emerges outside our Alliance can quickly turn into a threat to our member states' territory. Turkey could count on the protection of NATO Allies because NATO had the appropriate means available. The commitment to the collective defence thus remains at the centre of our Alliance. Without it, we would lose the basis for an effective protection of our vital interests and for dealing with new challenges, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Collective defence does not imply a passive NATO that is merely an insurance policy against the return of confrontation. Rather, it is the recognition that only countries that feel secure can be outward-looking and pursue creative policies to shape their strategic environment for the better.

## CONCLUSION: AN ALLIANCE OF SHARED VALUES

For almost half a century NATO has provided the backbone of Western security, protecting not only our territories but our shared values. Today, with East-West antagonism firmly behind us, the Allies have new opportunities to promote our shared values and to strengthen bilateral and multilateral links across the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

Turkey has a major role to play in this common endeavour. By virtue of history and geography it is a European, Balkan, Black Sea, Middle East and Mediterranean country. As a gateway to Central Asia, Turkey can help to give these new states an interest and an anchor in regional cooperation. It is making a crucial contribution to integrating these newly emerging states into a broader Euro-Atlantic structure of security and cooperation. Turkey also can serve as a model and guide for those states which aspire to follow the path of secular democracy. In short: in a world of rapid change, Turkey's partnership in the Alliance is more vital than ever.