

The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context

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Summary

The European Defence Community (E.D.C.) was an ambitious initiative in the first years of the 1950s. Leading European countries had different foreign policy agendas towards it. The E.D.C. could have been a crucial milestone on the long path towards European integration. However, the failure to ratify its agreement by the French Parliament in 1954 left this project of defence integration stillborn - but paved the way for another solution for the rearmament of Germany: the Western European Union (WEU), as a sub-group of NATO. Nevertheless, the dormant ideal, to contribute to a “European Army” later became one of the ultimate goals of the European Union.

The main argument of this paper is as follows: The E.D.C. cannot be regarded as an initiative originating only from the European countries. It can best be evaluated within the framework of general U.S. policies towards Europe and the U.S. global agenda in the first years of the Cold War era. One can trace the U.S. influence from the very first stages of the E.D.C. negotiations. Even in the agreement of the E.D.C., the footprints of U.S. policies can be observed, bringing the NATO Alliance to the forefront.

The E.D.C. is also interrelated with the Marshall Plan, which leads us to think that the E.D.C. was not solely a European dream as has been widely argued, but rather an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, which could be resorted to as and when needed. Preponderance of the evidence relating to the E.D.C. suggests that European unity and integration was, in the final analysis, an end product of U.S. policies implemented in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Re-entering the European Scene – The Marshall Plan

The 1930s were a nightmare for the U.S. economy and thus for the U.S. people. Financial troubles were high, unemployment was on the rise. The U.S. had to find ways out of this economic crisis. It had to seek new markets

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where it could trade freely and source raw materials for domestic production. This target has not changed for decades.

In Europe, economic structures and activities were substantially different from those of the U.S. Although leading European countries were losing their colonies, through a gradual process of independence, intra-trade was prevalent, but the Second World War was approaching. The European countries had to economise, increase savings so that they could finance the war without having any international assistance.

But this idea did not prevail. The Second World War destroyed major European economies, and had a negative impact on the U.S. economy. During his speech at Harvard University, on June 5, 1947, George C. Marshall described the European economies and their impacts on the US economy as follows:²

“Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization or simple destruction.”

It is noteworthy to mention here that according to Marshall, the Second World War demolished the business infrastructure of Europe and steps had to be taken to re-create the business environment there. Otherwise, the tides of economic instability were to reach the shores of the U.S. from Europe. The U.S. Government had to take the necessary measures to ease the desperation of the European people, or the consequences to the U.S. economy were apparent to all. Thus, according to Marshall, it was logical for the U.S. to spend every effort in order to re-institute a viable economic environment throughout the world. There came the notorious part of his speech at the Harvard University on 5 June 1947 declaring the philosophy of the Marshall Plan: *U.S. policy was directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be revival of a working economy.*³

Parallel to these developments, the Kiplinger Magazine elaborated the direct and indirect effects of the Marshall Plan. According to the magazine, the plan would increase wages of those in work, people would be doing business at home and in Europe.⁴ The main goal of the Marshall Plan was increased prosperity in the U.S., boosting exports. That may be one of the reasons why the Plan appealed to the American business people, bankers,

² Library of the U.S. Congress Records, “George C. Marshall, former U.S. Secretary of State, speaking at Harvard University, 5 June 1947”, <http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/m9.html>; Date of publication: 11 November 2003.

³ George Marshall, above-mentioned speech.

⁴ Kiplinger Magazine, Issue May 1948.

workers and farmers. In other words, under the Plan, monetary assistance would be provided to the European countries, assistance which they then spent on U.S. produced food and manufactured exports.⁵ The U.S. Council for International Chambers of Commerce supported aid to Europe in either or both of two forms: (1) U.S.-made military equipment and supplies made available to NATO countries; and (2) goods and services produced in NATO countries for their own forces under contract with the U.S. government and against payment in dollars. Thus the U.S. economy would flourish and overall U.S. exports would increase.

European Response Needed - Rebirth of the Ideas on European Unity

To promote a European economic recovery, the U.S. was very willing to spend money or to provide economic assistance to Europe for the reasons outlined above. However, the US was determined that a united Europe should itself play a part in the programme for recovery in so far as this was possible, although in the aftermath of the Second World War, there were few causes for optimism.

According to Marshall, an agreement had to be achieved among the European countries as to the requirements of the situation. The U.S. refrained from drafting a programme designed to place Europe on its feet economically, but clearly hinted at what it was expecting from the leading European countries. The European programme should offer practical opportunities for the U.S. to do business on the Continent. It should be parallel to the Marshall Plan and should be a joint programme, agreed to by a number of, if not all, European nations. The European Recovery Programme was tabled accordingly, in close cooperation with the U.S. The Programme had served the needs of European unity in the post – Second World War era and had been outlined, especially by Germany, as one of the major achievements of the U.S. Germany took the lion's share of U.S. material and psychological support, leaving France with a limited share of what was on offer.

In his speech on 5 June 1972, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt underlined the fact that the Marshall Plan challenged the European partners to enter in close economic cooperation and reiterated that inherent in the Plan was an appeal for a common political

⁵ Library of the U.S. Congress Records, “*Benefits of the Marshall Plan for the U.S. Economy*”, For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan; Library of Congress; <http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars11.html>; Date of publication: 11 November 2003.

course. He stated that the U.S. appeal was, though tentatively put, a call for European, or at least West European, unity.⁶

In fact, Brandt was emphasising the U.S. role in the origins of the European integration idea and European defence attempts.

The European Defence Community: Building up European Morale or Securing Trade Interests?

The U.S. was to build European morale in order to contain the “communist threat” that was already surrounding the “free world”. Eisenhower worked hard to establish positive European morale. As the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, he struggled to establish coherence and solidarity among the Allies to boost European morale. He thought that Western Europe should not fall to the communists, because that was the last remaining chance for the survival of western civilization.⁷ After assuming the command of NATO forces in Europe in 1951, he pointed out that the centre of the problem in Europe was the lack of a common morale and recreating it was the key to success. He also argued that America’s job in Europe was to provide enlightened leadership that would inspire and sustain confidence.⁸ That was the basis of collective security.

However, Eisenhower expressed different ideas to George Arthur Sloan on 20 March 1952.⁹ According to Ike, the U.S. was probably more nearly self-sufficient in the matter of elements of production than any other nation in the world. But, the U.S. was acutely dependent on numerous other areas for indispensable raw materials, such as manganese, tin, tungsten, uranium, cobalt, platinum, many drugs and to an increasing degree, copper, lead, zinc and oil.¹⁰ He was well aware that without these raw materials, the U.S. could not produce both the items and materials that were necessary for sustainable living standards of the American people. Nor, was it possible to produce military munitions for the security forces.

⁶ Library of the U.S. Congress Records, “Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany speaking at Harvard University, 5 June 1972”, <http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/m15.html>; Date of publication: 11 November 2003.

⁷ Frank Ninkovich, p.212.

⁸ Ibid., p.213

⁹ The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII, “Eisenhower’s, letter to George Arthur Sloan, March 20, 1952”, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 1097-1104.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.1098.

Thus, Eisenhower was proposing that American foreign policy must include the *purpose of maintaining access to, and trade with, all areas of the world from which the U.S. draws vital supplies.*¹¹

There was a rivalry between the U.S. and the “communist threat” on how to dominate the regions of the world rich with raw materials. Free access to these raw materials was the main and strategic aim, whereas securing transport lines was the operational and tactical aim. Eisenhower was of the opinion that some important raw materials which came from Southeast Asia, Iran and India, were already under threat from the Russians.

Europe and Southeast Asia were rich in raw materials. Europe, in particular, was the most suitable place to source the materials required for boosting production and exports, and as a bonus, had a skilled labour force. Influence over Western Germany should not be given up in favor of the Soviets. Strategic areas such as the Middle East were crucial in securing the Mediterranean Sea lines of communication.¹²

The U.S. was to serve as the principal arsenal for the free world. In addition, the U.S. end-state was to push the leading European nations to be capable of military strength at a reasonable date. Europe had to be capable of maintaining the necessary strength to defend itself if under attack, until the help of the free world could reach the Continent. To achieve this, a political and economic federation among West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux

¹¹ Ibid., pp.1098-1099.

¹² SACEUR General Eisenhower’s memorandum on October 9, 1951, on Turkey’s membership to NATO and including it to SACEUR’s command is of utmost importance in terms of his remarks on Mediterranean security. His assessment is as follows: “...*From the standpoint of the reputation of the Turks as excellent fighting men, any commander would be delighted to have them in his organization. Moreover, Turkey demonstrated determination to oppose Communistic aggression clearly makes her a valuable addition to the NATO Organization. Beyond this Turkish strength is of great significance to the accomplishment of the task presently assigned to me, which is the defence of Western Europe, from Norway to Italy. The southern flank of this front will, of course, be directly affected by developments in Eastern Europe and Turkey, which region not only dominates the land routes to the Middle East, but safeguards the eastern approaches of the Mediterranean. But in considering the question of military organization and command, we are forced to consider the hard facts of geography and distance. Despite the important contribution Turkey can make to the defence of my southern flank, I consider it militarily impracticable to watch over the interests and development of the Turkish armed forces from SHAPE, and to control operations from this headquarters. I, therefore, believe that it would be in the interests of NATO and of Turkey itself if Turkey should be included in the Middle East Command...*”; Eisenhower’s Memorandum to Alphonse Pierre Juin, William Joseph Slim and Omar Nelson Bradley, *Top Secret, October 9, 1951*; The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 627-628.

countries was a good answer for quickly accomplishing political and financial reforms in Europe. The U.S had to be insistent on this.¹³

The U.S. devised a security programme for the Defence of Europe: NATO. The U.S. motive in creating this organisation was to inspire the European nations to spend maximum effort in the formation of a common security programme so that America's donations of men, money, and materials would not be wasted. However, Eisenhower's considerations, which he took as his guide in the process of delivering collective security were to make certain:¹⁴

- a. "That a preponderance of the world's resources (including, as a major item, the production capacity and skilled workers of certain European countries) does not pass into the hands of the Soviets,
- b. "That the U.S. has access to those areas of the world from which it can draw raw materials vital to the U.S. economy and in which materials the Americans are either entirely lacking or have an insufficient amount,
- c. "That the governments in those areas which are friendly to the U.S. way of life, in order that the U.S. governments may count upon trade with them; a trade based upon the U.S. need of the essential raw materials and of a market for the exports that will pay for them."

Based on this realistic approach, Europe and all other important areas of the world were political and military outposts and they must serve for the U.S. the traditional functions of outposts.¹⁵ A large amount of power was neither necessary, nor desirable by the U.S.

Against this backdrop, the Europeans had been floating the idea of a European Defence structure, and it had parallels with the U.S. global design. The U.S., which had been pushing for political and economic unity in Europe, was supportive of the idea of using NATO as a tool to enforce the Defence and security architecture of the continent. According to U.S. long – term strategic thinking, as the goals were attained in Europe, U.S. expenditures would fall to a maintenance level and U.S. troops could gradually be brought back to the U.S. In a conversation that he had with the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Van Zeeland, Eisenhower said that he would be glad to accept a "European Army" in his command. However, Foreign Minister Strikker of Holland, with whom Eisenhower had previously had a similar talk, got the

¹³ *Eisenhower's letter to George Arthur Sloan...*; p. 1102.

¹⁴ The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII, "Eisenhower's letter to Lewis Williams Douglas, May 20, 1952", John Hopkins University Press, p. 1228.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.1230.

impression that Eisenhower's pressure on the Europeans to create an effective European army was motivated by a desire to send U.S. forces back to the United States.¹⁶ There came the attempts to create the European Defence Community (E.D.C.).

The E.D.C. and Positions of the Leading Countries

The Treaty setting up a European Defence Community was signed in the Salon de l'Horloge of the Quai d'Orsay (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on 27 May 1952. The text comprising 132 Articles aimed at creating a 100,000-strong European army integrated at the level of corps. A supranational commission would oversee the training of the army.¹⁷ Its command was to be conferred on SACEUR. Article 38 of the Paris Treaty provided for the creation of a federal type political union that would eventually extend its authority to the European army.¹⁸ Half of the troops were to be provided by France and the French Generals were to be in command of the West German units.

The E.D.C. was a leading item in NATO discussions in 1952. At its meeting in Lisbon on 20-25th February 1952, the North Atlantic Council consulted on the E.D.C. after referring to the memberships of Turkey and Greece to the Alliance on February 18, 1952. The NATO Council found that the principles underlying the Treaty to establish the E.D.C. conformed to the interests of NATO members. The Alliance also agreed to propose to its members and to the E.D.C. reciprocal security undertakings between the members of the two organizations, based on the understanding that NATO and the E.D.C. had a common objective: to strengthen the Defence of the Atlantic area. The development of the E.D.C. should be carried forward in this spirit. Each organization should be reinforcing the other.¹⁹

The U.S. decided to re-arm Germany against the "Communist threat" in 1950. On September 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson formally proposed this to his British and French counterparts. This proposal presented the French Government with an awkward problem and caused concern in

¹⁶ The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XII, "*Eisenhower's letter to William Averell Harriman, June 12, 1951*", John Hopkins University Press, pp.344-347.

¹⁷ To see the text of the Paris Treaty setting up the European Defence Community, visit the web site of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.france.diplomatie.fr/archives.gb/dossiers/schuman , Date of publication: 23 October 2003.

¹⁸ www.france.diplomatie.fr/archives.gb/dossiers/schuman/module05_2.html, Date of publication: 23 October 2003.

¹⁹ Some parts of the E.D.C. Treaty which are of military importance can be found at the end of this paper.

France. The French political leadership was against the rearmament of Germany. French Foreign Minister Schuman declared that “*Germany has no armaments and it will not have any.*”²⁰ The French did not want to see a militarily strong and economically superior Germany. But U.S. policies were decisive and the French policy planners had to devise a scheme to balance the U.S. interventionist policies. That required national strength and a viable economy, which France was lacking at that time. In addition, the French people, who had been humiliated during the Second World War by the German invasion, were not yet ready to accept a united and rearmed Germany - even in NATO. The French Newspaper *Le Monde* warned, “*Germany’s rearmament is contained in the Atlantic Pact as the embryo in the egg.*”²¹

But, the French Generals were in agreement with U.S. military planners and were advising Foreign Minister Schuman and Prime Minister René Pleven that a robust defence of Europe could not be provided without a rearmed Germany. Nevertheless, Monnet, who knew the American policies from first hand experience during his years in the U.S. in 1920s²², thus urged the French political leadership to act before it was too late²³. But it was already late. The Pleven Plan, which eventually became the E.D.C. was a desperate counter-proposal to buy time for debate and modification of the American plans.²⁴ At a 1951 meeting at Claridge’s Hotel in London, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, then leader of occupied West Germany, told Paul Henry Spaak of Belgium and Joseph Bech of Luxemburg that he was being forced to create a German national army again. He was advising other leaders in the meeting not to capitulate to nationalism and urged that they used every possibility to unify Europe.²⁵ It is interesting to note here that Dr. Adenauer’s thinking did not diverge from that of Eisenhower, who became the President of the U.S. after his military post as SACEUR. The U.S. was involved in the

²⁰ William R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World, An International History: The Bipolar World in the Truman-Stalin Era (1945-1953)*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 291.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Jean Monnet spent a certain portion of his life in the U.S. He was a member of U.S.-led German war reparations commission in 1926 and close to U.S. military planning circles. See John Gillingham, “Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal” in “Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity”, Edited by Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, St. Marten’s Press New York, 1991.

²³ For Monnet’s thoughts on the European Defence and Security, see Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1976, Chapter 14 : “*Naissance de deux traités*”, , pp. 393-434.

²⁴ Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1973, p. 163.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

E.D.C. negotiations²⁶ because it was one of the occupying powers in West Germany.

According to the U.S., the E.D.C. was, *inter alia*, an instrument to reintegrate Germany into Europe with necessary controls. Eisenhower believed that there was no solution to the German problem at the heart of Europe other than to build up NATO and Germany within it.²⁷ However, this deliberate choice sent tremors through some European countries, France in particular, which proposed the E.D.C. as its “own” solution. French decision makers could not accept U.S. views on Germany, because French public opinion expressed such high levels of concern over the proposal. One opinion poll taken in 1953, clearly illustrates French concern:²⁸

Existence of German military troops

Creates a danger to France.....	57%
Does not create a danger to France	25%
No opinion.....	18%

At this point, the U.S. felt obliged to support the French public to alleviate their anxiety. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was determined to see the integration of Germany inside the community of the European nations. He, in fact, had promised his friend, Dr. Adenauer that it would be done.

Mosley argues that for this aim, CIA funds were used to exert pressure on France, so that the French demonstrated their willingness to welcome the Germans back. Mosley further claims that from the CIA Director’s discretionary fund, the Director (Allen Welsh Dulles – brother of J.F. Dulles) paid one member of the French Cabinet \$ 30.000 a year for himself, and, during the French Parliament’s discussion on the E.D.C. project, handed him another \$ 500.000 to distribute among his fellow members.²⁹ Also, Dulles did not hesitate to fly to Paris to push forward the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty.

U.S. pressure was also exerted on the U.K. With a view to obtaining British support for the E.D.C., Dulles arrived in London on 3 February 1953. Dulles entreated British decision makers to give a “*little thinking*” to basic

²⁶ For example the “Spofford Proposals” on the E.D.C. Treaty by the U.S.

²⁷ Ninkovich, p. 233.

²⁸ Jarkko Tuominen, *The European Defence Community 1950-1954, The Second uneasy step towards the United States of Europe*, <http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kvtok/1997/3181.htm>, Date of publication: 23.10.2003.

²⁹ Leonard Mosley, *Dulles, A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network*, Dell Publishing Co., September 1979, p. 352.

American relations with Europe “*if France, Germany and England should go their separate ways.*” Mosley asserts that the implication here was that both the Marshall Plan aid and the U.S. commitment to NATO had been based on the condition that Europe, including Britain, must quickly achieve institutional unity.³⁰

The position of the U.K. government towards the E.D.C. changed over time and therefore this issue should be further elaborated. The U.K. position evolved from “coolness” to “general support”. However, British support to the Community was critical, because of the mutual security assurance sought by France which required the involvement of the U.K. The U.K. position was shaped against the backdrop of U.S. pressures and the French insistence on the mutual security assurance. At a later stage, the E.D.C. Treaty linked the Community very closely to NATO, with whom protocols of mutual guarantees have been exchanged.

The advantages and disadvantages of the U.K.’s participation in the E.D.C. were discussed at length in 1952. In a Top Secret memorandum from the British Foreign Secretary to the British Cabinet³¹ it was stated that the European Defence Community might never become established unless some more specific guarantee were given to it by the United Kingdom. The memorandum further stressed that if Western Germany was attacked by the Soviet Union, it would almost certainly be the signal for a Third World War and the U.K. would have to go to Germany’s aid whether it was committed by a formal undertaking or not. Therefore, it was proposed that the U.K. endorse the Foreign Secretary’s proposal to extend U.K. security commitments to the European Defence Community. This was what eventually happened.

However, the U.K. was cautious and adopted a reserved attitude, not only because it thought that the French might have second thoughts on creating a Third Force. The Following advantages and disadvantages were enumerated in a secret paper prepared by the British Ministry of Defence in November 1951:³²

Advantages

- The U.K. would be able to influence the policy of the E.D.C., and particularly Germany, more directly than it could through NATO channels.³³

³⁰ Mosley, p. 164.

³¹ U.K. declassified document ref: CAB 21/3583; www.pro.gov.uk/inthenews/defence_community/E.D.C.3.htm. Date of publication: 23.10.2003.

³² U.K. declassified document ref: CAB 21/3583; www.pro.gov.uk/inthenews/defence_community/E.D.C.3a.htm. Date of publication: 23.10.2003.

³³ Germany was not a NATO member then.

- Anglo-French solidarity would be strengthened and any German tendency to dominate the forces, particularly the army, would be counterbalanced.
- The U.K. would have a direct say in the organization and formulation of tactical doctrine, which is particularly required in respect of air forces.
- It would instil greater confidence into the EDC.
- It would counter any neutralist tendency within the EDC and would minimise the chance of the EDC becoming a “third force”
- American opinion, which supports the concept of European federation, would approve U.K. participation and might, as a result, be more willing to increase their aid.
- It might well tip the scales in favour of the creation of the E.D.C., which was still politically in the balance, and thus ensure German contribution.

Disadvantages

- An E.D.C. is a step towards Federation. Her Majesty's Government do not wish to become a part of a federated Europe, as this would: (i) involve a derogation of sovereignty, (ii) weaken the ties between the U.K. and the rest of the Commonwealth, and consequently, impair the international standing of the U.K., particularly vis-à-vis the United States.
- The U.K. would be handicapped in adapting politically or strategically, to any changes in international affairs.
- When the European Defence Zone is defined, there will be pressure to include the U.K. within it. This would involve placing forces for the defence of the U.K. in the E.D.C.
- The U.K. would not be able to maintain larger forces outside the E.D.C. than those it contributed to it.
- The U.K. forces committed to the Continent could only be withdrawn in the event of national emergency with the approval of the Commissioner, Supreme Commander and the Council of Ministers.
- In the short term, there would be a risk that the high efficiency of a British contribution would be impaired by inclusion in a new and inexperienced organization.
- The morale of British Units in the European Defence Forces would be likely to suffer as a result of becoming

“European” instead of “British” and this might have a serious effect on recruiting.

- Owing to the necessity for periodical change-overs between the U.K. forces allotted to the E.D.C. and those retained in the U.K.’s national army, there would be grave administrative difficulties connected with: (i) discipline and pay; (ii) training and the supply of equipment (until such time as complete standardisation was achieved).”
- The U.K. had not formally participated in the E.D.C. But, it involved itself in the process by sending an observer to the negotiations.³⁴

Conclusion

On 30 August 1954, Prime Minister Mendès of France submitted the E.D.C. Treaty to the French National Assembly. The Assembly Members voted 319 against, 264 for with 43 abstentions, the ratification of the Treaty therefore failed.³⁵

The E.D.C. was a wise move on the part of the French to counter-balance the U.S. strategic thinking in the aftermath of the Second World War. The French fear as a consequence of the U.S. decision to rearm Germany was, perhaps, the driving factor for the French Prime Minister. However, the U.S. was on the scene from the beginning of the process. The U.S. put pressure on E.D.C. countries to ratify the Treaty, it even provided mutual security assurances between NATO and the E.D.C., and persuaded and even threatened the U.K. into completing the security assurances towards the E.D.C.

The preponderance of evidence suggests that U.S. involvement in and supervision of the E.D.C. process was primarily due to economic and trade interests. Their primary aim was to create a stable Europe so that the U.S. private sector could operate and make business in the Continent. One can trace this argument in the speeches, letters and other correspondences of the U.S. leaders of that time. A number of revisionist publications complete the picture.³⁶ Germany was a reliable and predictable partner for the U.S. to promote its liberal policies on the Continent, whereas France was resisting the plan.

³⁴ Some argue that Britain’s reluctance to join the E.D.C. destroyed the E.D.C. plan. “*The Reluctant Partner?*”, <http://www.european-defence.co.uk/article6.html>.

³⁵ The reasons of the failure of the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty are beyond the scope of this Article and require a separate research.

³⁶ See, for example, David N. Gibbs, “Washington’s New Interventionism: U.S. Hegemony and Inter-Imperialist Rivalries”, *International Socialist Magazine*, September 2001, pp. 15-37.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the U.S. pursued a coherent policy of supporting and strengthening those governments which were democratic and centrist, aiming at the growing of a “Third Force” in Europe. The aim was to create moderate parliamentary rules that would be resistant to the Communists and also to the revival of authoritarian doctrines among conservatives³⁷. Pro-U.S. liberal policies could be pursued on the Continent in this fashion. As a result, it was not surprising to see that De Gasperi of Italy, Dr. Adenauer of Germany and Schuman of France, were described as “*Good Europeans*” speaking a common language.³⁸

In military terms, one can conclude that the U.S., therefore, evaluated the E.D.C. as a means of neither separate, nor separable military instrument from NATO. The main idea was that it could provide the Continent with an additional impetus to the revival of European fortress in the ashes of the Second World War. This approach confirms Lee Ray, who argues that the U.S. might even have suggested the E.D.C. to Pleven.³⁹ According to the U.S., German rearmament was necessary and although the French challenged the U.S. position, the European nations, who were entirely dependent on the U.S. for military and economic support, could not disagree with their great ally.

The U.S. global position may be seen as a natural reflex of a state, which has a primary duty of providing its citizens with an appropriate environment for economic prosperity and a wealthy life. But it is clear that the U.S. policies were disliked, as demonstrated by the re-emergence of conservatism, which regained ground under General De Gaulle of France.

³⁷ H. Stuart Hughes and James Wilkinson, *Contemporary Europe: A History*, Prentice Hall, NJ 07632, p.445.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.446.

³⁹ James Lee Ray, *Global Politics”, International Organizations and Transnational Actors: Federalism Versus Neofunctionalism*, Houghton Mifflin Company Fifth Edition. p.400.

ANNEX

Summary of some parts of the EDC Treaty which are of military importance

THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY

Article 1B:

A duty of the E.D.C. is to integrate the defence of forces of the Member States.

Article 2:

The Community will work in harmony with all free nations and with whatever organizations have similar aims.

Article 3:

There will be no discrimination between Member States.

Article 5:

The E.D.C. will consist of:-

- (a) A high authority (ex. "Commissioner", "College");
- (b) an Assembly;
- (c) a council of ministers;
- (d) a court of justice.

Article 6:

No Member State will maintain forces other than those mentioned in this Article.

Member States may recruit and maintain forces necessary to meet their non-European commitments.

With NATO's approval, forces of a Member State, put at E.D.C.'s disposal, may be placed at that State's disposal by the high authority in order to counter a grave crisis in that State's non-European territory. If so requested, and in times of emergency, the council may put other Member State's contribution at the disposal of one Member State.

Member States may raise their forces to meet commitments arising from their agreements with NATO, e.g. in Berlin and Austria.

Member States may interchange personnel between their contingents at the disposal of the E.D.C. and those not at its disposal, so long as there results no diminution in the E.D.F.

Article 7:

The E.D.F. will consist of conscripts and of professional soldiers.

The composition of the forces laid down in the annexed Protocol.

Recruitment in each Member State is governed by national laws, which will conform with principles defined in the Protocol.

The sea, land and air forces which constitute the E.D.F. are to be organized as defined in the Protocol.

Contingents are to be made available by Member States according to the programme set out in the Protocol. They will wear a common uniform.

Contingents from Member States are to be integrated according to the following principles:

Land Forces

Every basic unit will be composed of elements of one nationality. As far as possible logistic functions will be withdrawn from those units who will depend on higher formations for their support.

Army corps are to be composed of basic units from different countries, other than in exceptional cases for tactical or organizational reasons, where high authority and SACEUR agree upon its necessity. A unanimous veto of the council may veto such agreement.

The formations which support the basic units either tactically or logistically are to be integrated; the national elements of these formations are to be in a similar proportion to the basic units.

The headquarters of the army corps are to be integrated; such integration as will best assure their efficiency will be made.

Basic units and their supporting elements may at times be introduced into NATO army corps, and conversely, NATO divisions may be introduced into European army corps.

Command headquarters of NATO forces into which European units are introduced will integrate elements from these units, and vice-versa.

Air Forces

Every basic unit will be composed of elements of one nationality, each basic unit is to be equipped with combat aircraft of one type.

Logistic functions will, as far as possible, be withdrawn from these units which will depend on higher formations for their support.

A certain number of these basic units of different nationalities, other than exceptional cases for tactical or organizational reasons, will be grouped under the orders of higher formations, of integrated type, as defined in the Protocol. Formations ensuring logistic support are to be integrated; their elements being of one nationality and equally divided between basic units.

European basic units and their supporting elements may be introduced into NATO Commands and, conversely, NATO units may be introduced into European Commands.