

The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010

By John M. Hobson

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 393 pages, ISBN 9781107604544.

Theories of international relations are largely predicated upon certain ontological and epistemological premises that argue that the international politics of sovereign states can be objectively and universally explained. Ontologically the subject matter of international relations (IR) is the interactions among sovereign states in an anarchical world. The concepts of sovereignty and anarchy determine the structure, nature and mechanisms of world politics. Secondly the international is defined epistemologically, which gives itself to objective knowledge claims which, in turn, are seen as applicable to multiple/different spaces in the past, present and arguably the future. Nevertheless there is a growing literature criticising this idea of the international and problematising these ontological and epistemological premises by arguing that they actually reflect culturally specific understandings of self/subject, community, morality, politics and history that originated in a European historico-social existential

world. Pursuing this critical line of thought John M. Hobson in *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics* historically and conceptually shows that the “international theory constructs a series of Eurocentric conceptions of world politics”.

Hobson challenges the ontological and epistemological premises of international theory by developing the argument that, first, the sovereign state in essence refers to the Western conception of a socio-political community constructed through the dichotomy of Western civilisation and the so-called “savage” and “barbaric” polities, consequently assuming a hierarchical and unequal relationship between Western individual and collective identities and other non-Western socio-political communities. As he argues,

“A key message of this book is that all the major theories of the international in the last quarter millennium begin their analyses not with the sovereign state but with a social analysis wherein inter-state relations are derived from the application of a priori conception of the

“social standard of civilization”. And albeit in different ways international theory has in effect focused on the unequal field of global/civilizational hierarchy and gradated sovereignties”. (p. 19)

Secondly, since the knowledge claims of international theory reflect the civilisational identity of the West and also construct it as the referent point of social/political analysis, they are to be regarded as subjective and particular rather than objective and universal. As he says,

“...international theory does not so much explain international politics in an objective, positivist and universalist manner but seek, rather, to parochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive subject or, and as the highest or ideal normative referent, in world politics”. (p. 1)

That international theory originally refers to a Eurocentric conception of world politics and constructs/defends the civilisational identity of the West that was derived from the historical-intellectual context from 1760 to 2010 is Hobson’s main argument. In order to explore the historical-intellectual construction of Western international theory, he develops four generic categories, which are Eurocentric institutionalism, scientific racism, imperialism and anti-imperialism. Each of these generic Eurocentric conceptions has come to the fore in certain historical periods that Hobson separates from

1760-1914, 1914-1945, 1945-1989 and 1989-2010. Investigating Eurocentrism with these multiple forms and embedded in certain periods, Hobson not only seeks to distinguish himself from E. Said’s reductivist and analytically undifferentiated conception of Orientalism/Eurocentrism, which was built on an essentialist conceptualisation of the West and the East, but also aims to go beyond Marxist and postcolonial understandings of imperialism by combining coercive and materialist dimension of imperialism with its discursive/cultural and non-coercive/institutional components.

In the first section Hobson examines the concepts of manifest Eurocentrism and scientific racism that underpinned Western international theory from 1760 to 1914. He identifies all of the four variants of Eurocentrism as embedded within these periods in this historical-intellectual era. In the 1830-1914 period, Hobson sees paternalist-Eurocentric imperial conceptions of world politics articulated in classical liberal and Marxist theories, such as by R. Cobden, J. Bright, N. Angell, J. Hobson and K. Marx. He argues that classical liberalism and Marxism defended paternalist Eurocentric institutionalism by constructing a “formal hierarchical conception of gradated sovereignties”. Eastern polities have no sovereignty

since they are deemed either ‘barbaric’ or ‘savage’”. Within this paternalist Eurocentrism non-Western polities/cultures have conditional agency only if they fulfil “the rationality requirement” by accepting European rational institutions and moral attributes. In other words only after the miraculous touch of the European civilising mission would Eastern polities come into the world and gain the right of sovereignty. In the period from 1760-1800 Hobson looks at the classical liberal internationalism of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant which represent, for Hobson, Eurocentric anti-imperialism. They are anti-imperialist and anti-paternalist because they think that Eastern polities can have derivative sovereignty and are capable of development/civilisation without Western initiative.

In the third chapter, which covers 1850 to 1914, Hobson discusses scientific racist anti-imperialism that is embedded within classical liberalism and cultural realism, and specifically focuses on the writings of C.H. Pearson, H. Spencer, James Blair and David Jordon. For Hobson, these writers imagine “a racial apartheid conception of world politics” based on “an East-West division comprising a three informal hierarchy of white civilization, yellow barbarism and black savagery”. In this imaginary the (superior) Western civilisation is isolated

from its others so that it can preserve its pureness and uniqueness. Even if its hyper-sovereignty is rejected, full sovereignty is awarded only to Western civilisation and accordingly Eastern polities have only default sovereignty. In the last chapter covering the period from 1860-1914, Hobson examines racist imperialism in realism, liberalism and socialism and looks at writers such as A. Mahan, H. Mackinder, G. Ratzenhofer, B. Kidd, C. Dilke, J. Seeley, J. Strong, D. Ritchie, L. Wadd and S. Webb. This variant of Eurocentrism is premised on a racial hierarchy between the West and the rest. Eastern communities are regarded as either barbaric threats or racial inferiors. In both cases they are either to be exterminated or contained. Offensive racists like racist anti-imperialists have constructed “a racial apartheid conception of world politics” based on a racial standard of civilisation.

In the second part of his book, Hobson examines the world from 1914-1945, the period in which, according to the conventional narrative, the discipline of IR emerged. Hobson calls the so-called idealist-realist debate as an exercise in myth-making in the construction of the discipline, and argues that this era could be best understood as “the final climax of scientific racism and the high tide of manifest Eurocentrism”. He seeks to develop the argument that the

identity crisis and loss of confidence in Western civilisation underpinned the philosophical-political writings and most importantly shaped Western international theory in this era. This anxiety, for Hobson, informed not only the cultural realism of the “classical geopolitikers” but also Wilsonian “idealism”, both of which in their own ways defended Western colonialism and thereby kept the world safe and stable for the West. In addition to this manifest Eurocentrism, which was either expressed through the power (geo-race) politics of cultural realists or by principles of self-determination and democracy of offensive liberal-racists, Hobson also accuses the Marxist theories of imperialism developed by such writers as Lenin, Luxemburg and Bukharin of subliminal Eurocentrism since they conceived Western civilisation (its colonialism and global capitalism) as “the higher normative referent in progressive world politics”.

The third part of the book covers the period from 1945-1989 and is explored in three chapters where Hobson examines the mainstream theories of IR, namely classical/neorealism, liberalism/the English school and structural Marxism. The gist of this part is that even if IR theory has rejected its manifest and racist presuppositions, for Hobson, “it failed to escape the generic political bias of

Western-centrism that had underpinned pre-1945 international theory. This ‘Westphalian’ or West-centric thinking took the form of what I call subliminal Eurocentric institutionalism” (p. 185). Both classical realism and the hegemonic stability theory in their own ways constructed a narrative of world politics which was premised on Europeans, as a result of their exceptional and pioneering characteristics, creating the modern capitalist sovereign-states system and expanding it through imperialism or hegemony to the rest of the world. For example Morgenthau’s concept of balance of power was part of this Eurocentric conception of world politics as it assumed certain (read as European) normative, socio-cultural and political prerequisites, such as the arguments that guiding interactions among sovereign states would stabilise the structure of international system. Like in Carr, for Hobson, Morgenthau’s narrative of world politics was “the story of intra-Western relations” and which had no place for non-Western societies. This is true for Waltzian “ahistorical structuralism” which denied Eastern agency and reified Western agency by confining itself to US hegemony and imperial hierarchy. Subliminal Eurocentrism was most apparent in neoliberal institutionalism, which explicitly started with the common ideational foundation of states

for cooperative interactions, that is global capitalism. The English school followed this logic of immanence by defining international society as an endogenous development of Europe and explained world politics as the expansion of this European international system to the globe. Even if this world system approach and neo-Gramscian political economy had unearthed the European capitalist underpinnings of international system by bringing hegemony and imperialism back into historical and social analyses of capitalist modernity, Hobson claims that due to their Eurocentric presuppositions they naturalised Western domination and reified its agency against non-Western subjectivities.

In the last part of the book, which examines the post-Cold War period, Hobson elaborates the emergence of manifest Eurocentrism in IR theory. In its realist form as found in the writings of such people as Kaplan, Huntington and Ferguson, Hobson argues that there has been a return to a post-1889 racist realism. This line of thought has perceived globalisation as an Eastern threat, constructed the idea that anarchy, terror and new barbarism is coming from non-Western societies, and prescribed/defended Western values either by promoting them to Eastern societies or by strictly separating the West from the rest and consolidating its Western identity.

What is common in all these realist thinkers has been that they construct Islam or China as an antithesis to Western civilization and accordingly attribute non-European polities with “predatory/barbaric agency”. For Hobson, Western liberalism, that is a conglomeration of liberal constructivism, democratic peace, neoliberal institutionalism and liberal cosmopolitanism, complements offensive Western realism. The paternalist Eurocentrism of Western liberalism was triggered by optimism and triumphalism. It has aimed to universalise Western civilisation through the gradual assimilation of Western values, norms and practises by non-Western societies. Hobson claims that Rawls’s well-ordered society, Held’s cosmopolitan democracy and Teson and Nussbaum’s justification of humanitarian intervention in their own ways reflect Western historical-cultural determinations and its political priorities, defends their universal validity, promote them as the normative-political subjects/objects and constructs a world in its own image, all the while having non-Western societies as only passive receivers with conditional agency, thereby giving Western civilisation hyper-agency.

By developing the idea that IR theory is premised on the social-civilisational definitions of sovereignty and that it imagines the international through stratified/graduated sovereignty, which

accordingly leads to the hierarchical/unequal construction of the Western and non-Western agencies, Hobson seeks to challenge the mainstream historiography of the discipline of IR, and argues that IR theory is the discourse of Western civilisation. But more importantly, uncovering the historical and conceptual bases of Eurocentrism in IR theory can make it possible not only to rethink concepts, such as self, community, universality/particularity, identity/difference, morality and politics, that inform the European conception of the international, but can also craft historical

narratives and conceptual frameworks that deal better with multiplicity, diversity and difference in the contemporary world by recognising the agency of diverse socio-political communities, the validity of distinct historico-cultural worlds and the possibility of alternative social/international imaginaries in the constitution of the global.

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Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign Policy

By Justin Hart

New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 279 pages, ISBN: 9780199777945.

In *Empire of Ideas*, author and historian Justin Hart offers a delightful analysis of how public diplomacy gestated in U.S. foreign policy at a time of the country's rising global domination in the 1930s. Hart traces the historical genesis of the U.S. government's efforts to win the hearts and minds of foreign audiences from the period of 1930s through to the 1950s. He seems to have made a valuable contribution to

this ever-growing literature by offering an elaborate account of early efforts at public diplomacy and the philosophical assumptions underpinning U.S. foreign policy. The study successfully links the U.S. experience under study with contemporary discussions in public diplomacy.

The central problem that Hart deals with is when and why the U.S.

government decided to include the techniques of public diplomacy into its efforts to shape the image of the U.S. abroad. His purpose is to delve into U.S. history to unearth the fundamental reasons why the U.S. government employed certain public diplomacy techniques in its contemporary foreign policy.

On the basis of in-depth research into official documents and memoirs, Hart confidently argues that the U.S. government attempted to incorporate public diplomacy into foreign policy processes for the first time at the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936. It was this particular conference in which the U.S. government was committed to a series of cultural and educational exchanges with countries in Latin America to cultivate a friendly image for the U.S. in the minds of foreign audiences. The issue of such an “image” became part of U.S. foreign policy when American policy makers acknowledged that the nation’s image played a role in its postcolonial strategy as an emerging superpower with influence over the world while avoiding the costs associated with a conventional territorial empire. Such a move came as former imperial powers in Europe were in decline, and the U.S. was ready to fill the power vacuum. It thus opted for domination over the world through ideas and “U.S. values”. The nation’s

image was also an essential component of its transformed foreign policy.

Hart concludes that the concept of image played a role in U.S. foreign policy considerations at the time. Nevertheless, it remained a very minor role. He points out that image has always been a contested concept because of its political nature, which allows the political power to choose what to include into its definition. Therefore, public diplomacy constituted a point of contention between the government and the opposition for many years. Policy makers were often criticized for how their methods, management, and messages projected the image of the U.S. abroad.

Hart has thus made a valuable contribution to the literature by offering a rich analysis of policy discussions and underlying assumptions of public diplomacy in U.S. history. First of all, he sheds lights on various challenges that the U.S. government faced in articulating public diplomacy initiatives at the time. The contention between the government and opposition groups about how to define America abroad is well documented and thoroughly discussed in the book. Another dilemma was in balancing messages given to allies in Europe and those given to the foreign audiences in the former colonies of those

European allies. The third challenge was how to accommodate in the nation's image facts about racial discrimination against the black population in the U.S. The book provides a fascinating account of how all these challenges shaped public diplomacy initiatives in U.S. foreign policy.

In addition, from a novel perspective as a historian of public diplomacy, Hart revisits various conventional issues such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to bring to the fore elements associated with public diplomacy in foreign policy. Through convincing comparisons and contrasts, Hart succeeded in transforming otherwise dull, conventional issues into topics provoking further research. This is incredibly valuable for academics interested in comparative studies and looking for raw materials to use in their work.

Furthermore, Hart contributes to theoretical discussions in public diplomacy with his assertion that the lines between domestic and foreign affairs are blurred in public diplomacy. The nation's image abroad is greatly influenced by what happens in the domestic realm, and hence public diplomacy initiatives directed at foreign audiences affected the domestic political climate. The permeability of boundaries

between domestic and foreign is an issue which invites further discussion among academics in the future.

Lastly, Hart presents a convincing map of the process by which public diplomacy was institutionalized. He reviews the numerous success and failure stories of those institutions as well as the personal characteristics and professional backgrounds of their leaders. These stories may offer guidelines for policy makers today on what to do and how to do it for a successful outcome in public diplomacy initiatives.

In fact, the greatest strength of this impressive book often seems to lie in its elaborate recounting of the shortcomings of public diplomacy initiatives and the struggles of American policy makers to overcome those challenges. My main concern, however, is the way Hart handles U.S. propaganda, which he greatly overemphasizes in articulating his argument about the origin of public diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy. While acknowledging that public diplomacy is a set of techniques drawing on various sources, including propaganda, communications, and cultural diplomacy, Hart explicitly refers to propaganda as the single most important source of public diplomacy. He even goes beyond that, implying that public diplomacy is simply a form

of propaganda by using the two terms interchangeably throughout his analysis.

Nevertheless, propaganda and public diplomacy are two different concepts. While there is certainly a degree of overlap in communication techniques used in these fields, the most important difference is that propaganda is a monologue assuming the existence of a passive audience while public diplomacy is a two-way dialogue between the government and active foreign audiences. In addition, propaganda is a historically conditioned and politically charged concept. It calls for manipulation and deception in communication with foreign audiences, which inevitably raises ethical questions about the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, calls for positive concepts such as engagement with, active listening to, and learning from external circles. Therefore, using these two terms interchangeably undermines the credibility of Hart's earlier argument that public diplomacy stemmed from and related to the U.S. experience in various fields such as cultural diplomacy, propaganda, communications, and public relations, among others.

Moreover, considering public diplomacy as euphemism for propaganda discourages study of public diplomacy.

No academic or policy maker would like to be known as a propagandist, being, on the contrary, extremely careful to distance public diplomacy from propaganda both in theoretical discussions and policy initiatives. Hart's argument may thus be improved if the contours of public diplomacy are better defined. In addition, a comparative analysis of public diplomacy with other related concepts may bring clarity to the fundamental terms mentioned in the book.

Furthermore, Hart relates public diplomacy to public opinion, arguing that the emergence of public diplomacy reflected a growing awareness of public participation in U.S. foreign relations as early as the 1930s. This is too far-fetched an argument since it is rather difficult to claim that effective public participation in foreign policy processes existed at that time. For many decades, foreign policy had been the prerogative of an exclusive club of state and Foreign Service officials. Even if public opinion can be said to play a role in the perception of the nation's image abroad, it is not obvious that the American people were aware of it or that they consciously contributed to the process. Hart's argument may be improved if he more precisely documents the impact of public participation in public diplomacy. This is, however, not an easy task since measuring the

impact of public diplomacy initiatives constitutes the Achilles heel of public diplomacy studies.

Overall, Hart deserve much credit for his impressive recounting of the story on the origin of public diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy. He successfully interrogates underlying dynamics of public diplomacy and convincingly explains when and why the U.S.

government included public diplomacy efforts in its foreign policy. It is obvious that this work will remain relevant to contemporary discussions about public diplomacy for many years to come.

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Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar (Turkey's Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors, Practices)

By Ali Balcı

Istanbul: Etkileşim Publications, 2013, 344 pages, ISBN: 9786051315003.

The literature on Turkey's foreign policy has been growing in recent years. However, most such studies deal with recent developments and are therefore agenda-dependent studies. This is partly because of the changeable nature of Turkey's foreign policy over the last decade, with its many striking but contradictory moves, which has rendered it quite attractive to researchers. One development that has become a particularly popular discussion topic both in Turkey and abroad is Turkey's "shift of axis". Added to this, the swift spread of international relations departments in

Turkey and the increasing number of scholars studying foreign policy issues have also contributed to the skyrocketing number of academic papers dealing with Turkey's foreign policy during the first decade of the 2000s.

This growing interest in Turkey's foreign policy has created a need for brief but all-inclusive books. Existing studies dealing with Turkey's foreign policy in general, however, are either too comprehensive to read in a short time or are edited volumes with many problems of coherency. Ali Balcı's *Turkey's Foreign*

Policy: Principles, Actors, Practices meets this need by providing a short introduction to Turkey's foreign policy.

Balcı attempts to provide an analysis of Turkey's foreign policy from Atatürk's time to the present in his book. The volume is composed of eleven chapters all of which are divided into three sub-chapters dealing with principles, actors, and practices in specific periods in Turkey's foreign policy. Balcı differentiates each period by focusing on the main principles of the time in question. For example, while pragmatism is presented as the main character of Atatürk's period, the following chapters emphasise the active neutrality of İnönü's period, the active Americanism of Menderes' period, and the multidimensionality with a special inclination to the Western axis for the military tutelage of the 1960s respectively. Foreign policy was especially made by the leaders at these times, and they mostly followed a balance of power policy to meet Turkey's security demands.

The following chapters cover, respectively, the continuation of multi-dimensionality during the Ecevit and National Front period of the 1970s, the neoliberal tendencies in the military-dominated period of the early 1980s, neoOttomanism in the Özal period, security and secularism driven foreign

policy in the coalition government period of the 1990s, and the Europeanization at the end of the 1990s. The author deals with the foreign policy of Turkey in the Justice and Development Party period from 2002 to 2009 with a special focus on the zero-problem principle approach to neighbouring states.

The primary contention of the book is that the foreign and domestic policies cannot be separated. For the author, foreign policy is one of the main instruments shaping domestic power relations among different actors. In other words, foreign policy functions as a strategy in the hands of the ruling power bloc, silencing oppositional discourses and delimiting the boundaries of the existing hegemonic state identity. Balcı's treatment of the key actors of each period reveals that what affects the decision making process is the relation between foreign and domestic policies, which are thus dealt with together in the book.

Balcı also criticizes existing books which idealize a specific period of Turkey's foreign policy while decrying the others. The author challenges this idea and therefore he both tries to avoid depicting any one period as a "golden age" and takes a critical stance towards each period. The author has also chosen unusual wording for his title; instead of "*Turkish* foreign policy", Balcı prefers

“*Turkey’s Foreign Policy*”. The title of the book is thus a bold attempt to deviate from a nationalist narration of foreign policy in Turkey.

Rather than being a polemic, however, the book is presented as a course book for students in international politics. Accordingly, it is divided into eleven chapters applicable for an academic semester. While the author’s analysis of some events and concepts lacks detail, he also advises a list of further reading at the end of each chapter, prompting the reader to further interrogate and research the subject matter. Yet, added to this vagueness about events and concepts, the book often fails to inform the reader about whether particular issues are controversial or not. For instance, the description of the Lausanne Treaty does not mention the deep controversy about it in the scholarship in Turkey; while some academics describe it as an extraordinary success, others claim that it sought to curtail the independence of the republic and describe it as unsuccessful.

Taken as a whole, the book presents a clear outline of actors, principles,

and practices in Turkey’s foreign policy for interested students and researchers. The book has no intention of giving exhaustively detailed information about Turkey’s foreign policy: rather, it aims to create an idea in readers’ mind on which to build further reading. The broad capacities, limitations, and sources of Turkey’s regional and international power are briefly illustrated in the book without getting lost in details. This practicality of the book is also helpful to lecturers seeking to use it as a course book on Turkey’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the book can also be criticised for putting forward some controversial arguments, especially in the subchapters on decision-making processes and principles in Turkey’s foreign policy. Overall, however the book provides a readable introduction for students who are becoming interested in Turkey’s foreign policy.

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Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Türk Dilli Halklar, Dil Sorunu, Yeniden Biçimlenen Kimlikler (Turkic-Speaking People in the Post-Soviet Era: Language Problems and Newly Restructured Identities)

By Jale Garibova

Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 2012, 302 pages, ISBN: 9789751624918.

In the 1990s, there was widespread shock when the Turkish public learned that, during meetings of Turkic-speaking states, Central Asian leaders delivered their opening speeches in Russian. Yet this scandal simply highlighted Turkish citizens' limited knowledge of post-Soviet Turkic states. It also reflected Turkey's historical tendency to remain aloof from its Turkic-speaking neighbours until 1991 in order not to alienate or threaten Communist leadership. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union paved the way for rapprochement between Turkic-speaking people and created a new academic interest in the region in Turkey. In this framework, a valuable project entitled "Re-Demarcated Borders: Structured Identities in Eurasia" has made an important contribution to Post-Soviet regional studies in Turkish. This project aims to explore political and social transformations in the Post-Soviet region, emphasizing the nation and state-building processes. The last book

of the four volume project is Turkic-Speaking People in the Post-Soviet Era: Language Problems and Newly Restructured Identities by Prof. Dr. Jale Garibova. Garibova has contributed to this project as an insider voice from the region. Her work has concentrated on a research subject which has been somewhat neglected in Turkey; national languages and language policies in post-Soviet Turkic-speaking states.

The book addresses key issues of national languages in the region and their impact on newly restructured national identities. Garibova's specific aim is to analyse how language policies, characterized by de-Russification and de-Sovietization, are determined and enforced in these republics. She clearly underlines the legacy of Soviet language policies, and evaluates the geographic, demographic, and historical constraints on post-Soviet language policies.

The book begins by introducing the theoretical and conceptual framework of

language policies, and the author clarifies her preferred integrative theoretical approach, which is not based on a single or general theory. In order to prevent terminological confusion due to the lack of consensus, the author attempts to define the main terms that are used throughout the book, and this overview provides a valuable terminological contribution to language studies.

The first part focuses on the nature of language policies, language behaviour, and the development of national identity in Turkic-speaking republics such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. It starts with an analysis of factors affecting post-Soviet Turkic people's processes of identity construction, and Garibova emphasizes social and political conditions during the Soviet period. Moreover, she sheds light on little-known forms of identity that were and remain important in the region, such as national, mixed, corporate, and group identities. In the second part of this chapter, the author clarifies the features of language policies in the post-Soviet era by emphasizing the priorities of language policies and the factors that determine these policies. For Garibova, language policies are determined by state-building and identity construction processes, as well as de-Sovietization and de-Russification, globalization, and ethnic and regional

relations. The third part of the chapter examines the status of titular languages in five Turkic-speaking republics. The driving force behind the language policies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, as well as the constraints on these policies are analysed in detail. Garibova notes that although newly independent states are enthusiastic about their language policies, the implementation of language laws faces many difficulties in practice.

One particularly valuable contribution the author makes comes from her analysis of the impact of language policies on different ethnic groups, especially these countries' Russian residents. This study points out the diversity of application of language policies in different republics depending on their demographic differences regarding minority groups. Language policies have to reflect the difference between state language and language of inter-ethnic communication. The density of ethnic Russians living in Turkic-speaking republics changes their approaches to the status of the Russian language. Harsh language policies create social pressure on Russian populations that cannot speak titular languages. For this reason, post-Soviet leaders prefer to promote titular languages without alienating Russian minorities, especially in Turkic-speaking Central Asian republics (though it is a great

pity that the book does not address the linguistic problems of the Uzbek minority in Tajikistan). Nevertheless, efforts to promote the use and prestige of titular languages face significant obstacles and resistance. The status of Russian language is still decisive in higher education and in other critical fields, including healthcare and mass media. In addition to the perceived prestige of Russian, titular languages face challenges from the expansion of English and Turkish due to the increasing economic and political relations of the US and Turkey with the region. As well as these language promotion efforts, Garibova also looks at writing, alphabet, vocabulary and terminology in order to evaluate the competitiveness and prestige of Turkic languages. She concludes the chapter with an overview of the sociolinguistic prospects in these republics, concentrating in particular on immigration after the collapse of Soviet Union. This provides meaningful data on the sociolinguistic situation in these republics in post-Soviet era, and greatly increases the quality of the analysis.

The second section assesses language movements within and between Turkic-speaking Autonomous Republics in Russian Federation, such as the Altai, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Khakassia, Sakha, Tatarstan and Tuva Republics from a historical perspective. The author

examines the impact of the Soviet policies, such as the decentralization (1920-1930) and then internationalization of titular languages, linking these historical trends to contemporary policies. The author also gives an overview of the impact of Russia on contemporary language movements; although Turkic languages now have official language status, Russian still has priority in these republics.

Garibova's book clearly reveals that language as a critical component of nation building and national identity is formulated in a highly politicized arena in the post-Soviet region. The book has several strengths that make it stand out, especially for the Turkish academic community. First of all, Garibova's work is valuable for its emphasis on post-Soviet republics. The book refers to authentic sources which are difficult to access in Turkey. Garibova was able to conduct extensive fieldwork and provides us with a rich analysis, especially in the part on Azerbaijan. Second, her valuable research on the post-Soviet independent states is lucid and well-organized and is easy to read for those not familiar with the subject.

For the section on Turkic-speaking autonomous republics in Russian Federation, Garibova based her analysis on secondary sources. In addition, the part on Autonomous Republics in Russia

also suffers from the lack of clarity, making it difficult to understand for readers not familiar with the subject. Specifically, while the data on the sociolinguistic situation in these countries increases the quality of the analysis, it would have been clearer if she had used tables to help the reader visualize the changes over time. The book would also have benefitted from better organization of the argument about newly restructured identities. In particular, the theoretical framework, introduced at the beginning, is not connected to other parts of the book. This is especially evident when she analyses the impact of Turkey on identity construction process, where she fails to connect it with local language movements and policies.

The book is particularly valuable for bringing forward a somewhat implicit argument of international influence on language policies in post-Soviet republics; the author critically assesses the impact of Russia, historically and presently, in these communities and also briefly evaluates the increasing role of Turkey and the West. For this reason, Garibova's book on this under-researched subject presents a valuable contribution for studies in International Relations, and is encouraging and helpful for Turkish readers with an interest in language and language policies.

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